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This paper introduces hyperbolic discounting into politics. In our model,
politicians act according to the preferences of voters in order to be re-elected.
As voters￿preferences are dynamically inconsistent, the political process results
in an allocation of the public budget that is distorted towards consumption ex-
penditures. We show that this ine¢ ciency is mitigated when the in￿ uence of
bureaucrats who favour an excessive supply of public goods is taken into ac-
count. Finally, we derive a positive relationship between the optimal level of a
bureaucracy￿ s in￿ uence and the relevance of long-term investments in a given
policy area.
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Beginning with Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) political agency models show that
elections are an appropriate incentive device for disciplining the self-interest of politi-
cians.1 Moreover, there is an increasing number of empirical studies that provide
evidence of the bene￿cial e⁄ects of elections.2 On the other hand, political budget
cycle models following Nordhaus (1975) argue that politics becomes short-sighted and
populist whenever elections are pending. These negative consequences of elections are
also supported empirically.3 In spite of the outlined ambiguity in the literature, the
precise conditions under which voters evaluate government programs correctly and the
e⁄ect of the institutional setting on the extent of political short-sightedness is still
under-researched.4
We propose hyperbolic discounting as an alternative rational for political short-
sightedness. If voters￿preferences are dynamically inconsistent and politicians tend to
act according to will of the electorate in order to be re-elected, the political process
results in an allocation of public funds which is distorted towards consumption expen-
ditures. This idea can be captured in a simple framework which allows for the analysis
of di⁄erent institutional settings. We show that the presence of an independent bureau-
cracy might improve long-term welfare: As bureaucrats increase public expenditures
excessively, they also raise the level of public investment which is bene￿cial if voters
erroneously opt for too much consumption due to hyperbolic discounting.
In order derive our results, we extend the retrospective voting model of Persson
and Tabellini (2000) by incorporating hyperbolic discounting on the side of voters (and
the other political actors). Following the seminal work by Laibson (1997), numerous
empirical studies have established evidence of dynamically inconsistent preferences.5
In recent time, researchers began to transfer this idea to public economics.6 Yet,
hyperbolic discounting has so far still mainly been applied to individual choices like
saving or consumption decisions, but been neglected in political economics. We start
1For a recent survey see Besley (2006).
2See e.g. Besley, Persson and Sturm (2005) who con￿rm their hypothesis that elections reduce
the in￿ uence of interest groups in an empirical study of the development of the U.S. South.
3For a recent cross-country analysis see e.g. Shi and Svensson (2006).
4One explanation are informational asymmetries between voters and politicians. Rogo⁄ (1990)
proposes an adverse selection model where the more talend politician distorts the budget. Shi and
Svensson (2006) come up with a moral hazard model of electoral competition. Both approaches di⁄er
from our as they rely on hidden information as the only source of political short-sightedness.
5Most recent studies like Shapiro (2005) and Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2006) ￿nd signi￿cant
evidence of dynamically inconsistent behaviour.
6See Bernheim and Rangel (2005) for a recent survey of that literature.
1to scrutinize this new possibility by studying the e⁄ects of a systematic bias against
future payo⁄s on political decisions.
In our model, the government can o⁄er two distinct kinds of public goods, a short-
term consumption good and a long-term investment good. Most importantly, citizens
vote according to today￿ s wishes and against their own long-term interests.7 Hence,
voters reward public investment expenditures at the polls less than they actually should
do. This in turn gives the incumbent politician an incentive to shift expenditures to-
wards current consumption in order to be reelected thereby choosing a suboptimal
allocation of public funds. We show that this ￿populist￿distortion, i.e. the distor-
tion towards present consumption due to hyperbolic discounting, prevails even if the
political process is perfectly transparent and politicians cannot appropriate any rents
for themselves. In contrast, the ￿imperfect agency￿distortion, i.e. the rents appropri-
ated by the incumbent politician, disappears completely when transparency becomes
perfect.8
After showing that hyperbolic discounting on the side of voters might result in
distorted policy outcomes, we analyze how the extent of political short-sightedness is
shaped by the institutional setting.9 We thereby focus on non-elected political insti-
tutions and bureaucracies in particular. More precisely, we think of top bureaucrats
in ministries and at other government agencies who have a considerable in￿ uence on
political decisions due to their special knowledge of ￿ their￿policy area.10 The self-
interest of these bureaucrats is summarized in a bias for high government expenditures
as proposed by Niskanen (1971) in our model.11 Note that these special interests of bu-
reaucrats are - in contrast to those of politicians - not curbed by electoral constraints as
bureaucrats are often appointed for a long time. Consequently, bureaucrats are less sen-
sitive to citizens￿preferences as correctly criticized by Public Choice scholars.12 In our
setting, however, this deviation from the will of the electorate is not welfare-decreasing
in general, but may entail a welfare-improving ￿ ip-side: If bureaucrats increase public
expenditures excessively, they also raise the level of public investment which is bene￿-
cial if political competition is sti⁄ and voters opt for short-term bene￿ts. A priori it is
7Similarly, O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003) argue that people may consume too much of certain
unhealthy items, such as fatty food, even though realizing this failure.
8Empirically, it has been shown that more ￿scal transparency reduces rents (e.g. Alt and Lassen,
2006) and that elections a⁄ect the composition of public expenditures (e.g. Shi and Svensson, 2006).
9Our results regarding non-elected institutions require a political distortion towards short-term
expenditures and do not rely depend on hyperbolic discounting speci￿cally.
10Though politicians have the legal right to take policy decisions, bureaucrats elaborate drafts and
￿nally implement policies.
11For a summary of the empirical evidence see Mueller (2003).
12See e.g. Rowley and Elgin (1988).
2not clear whether this bene￿cial e⁄ect dominates the detrimental overall expenditure
increase caused by bureaucrats. However, it can be shown that starting from a situa-
tion where politicians have full control, a small increase of the bureaucrats￿in￿ uence
increases voters￿welfare. This result is based on a typical second best argument: The
increase of public consumption is a second order loss, whereas the increase of public
investment is a ￿rst order gain. The positive welfare e⁄ect occurs even though bu-
reaucrats do not possess any better information and equally su⁄er from hyperbolic
discounting as voters and politicians do.
Finally, we take into account that the relative importance of consumption and
investment expenditures di⁄ers across policy areas. Capturing this idea, we derive
a positive relationship between the importance of investment expenditures and the
optimal level of in￿ uence of bureaucracies.13 This analysis contributes to the discussion
of whether political agents should rather be appointed or elected. Alesina and Tabellini
(2006b), for example, study this question in a career concern model with multiple
tasks and come to the analog conclusion that bureaucrats are better if short-termism
is prevalent. In contrast to their work, our paper mainly focuses on the joint e⁄ect of
the interaction between bureaucrats and politicians.14
The empirical literature on the e⁄ects of bureaucracies is consistent with our central
hypothesis. Rauch (1995) shows that the establishment of professional bureaucracies
instead of politically appointed ones was crucial for growth when analyzing municipal
reforms in US cities at the beginning of the 20th century. He argues that professional
bureaucracies increased the time horizon of public decision makers. In a subsequent
investigation Evans and Rauch (1999) specify the key institutional characteristics of
the successful ￿ Weberian￿bureaucracy like meritocratic recruitment through compet-
itive examinations, civil service procedures for hiring and ￿ring rather than political
appointments and dismissals, and ￿lling higher levels of the hierarchy through inter-
nal promotion. Our model o⁄ers a way to reconcile Rauch￿ s empirical results with
Niskanen￿ s view of budget-expanding bureaucrats. A certain level of bureaucratic in-
￿ uence generates Rauch￿ s results, whereas an excessive in￿ uence con￿rms Niskanen￿ s
hypothesis.
Our result that the in￿ uence of bureaucracies might be welfare increasing stands in
contrast to the classical literature following Niskanen (1971) which generally evaluated
13Practically, the level of independence could be adjusted by varying the degree of independence
granted to bureaucrats.
14Besley and Coate (2003) argue that elected regulators are more pro-consumer as elections allow
to unbundel policy issues. Alesina and Tabellini (2006a) conclude that bureaucrats are preferable to
politicians in technical tasks for which ability is more important than e⁄ort.
3expenditure increases as detrimental. One exemplary application of this negative view
of bureaucracies can be found in Fuest (2000). When considering the welfare e⁄ects
of tax competition, Edwards and Keen (1996) emphasized the need to evaluate both
the economic distortions caused by tax competition and existing political distortions.
Fuest (2000) provides an extension where politicians only have limited control over ￿scal
policy and have to bargain with bureaucrats about the budget. In his framework welfare
unambiguously declines as bureaucrats gain bargaining power. This analysis, however,
only focuses on the absolute level of public expenditures and o⁄ers no di⁄erentiated
examination of public expenditures.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a basic model of politicians
under electoral constraints. Section 3 discusses the incentives which bureaucrats face
and incorporated bureaucrats into the decision-making process. The welfare implica-
tions of our model are analyzed in section 5. In section 6 we extend the model by
deriving policy speci￿c optimal levels of bureaucratic in￿ uence. Section 7 concludes
with an outlook on possible future research.
2 A basic voting model with hyperbolic discounting
We start with introducing hyperbolic discounting into the retrospective voting frame-
work presented by Persson and Tabellini (2000). In our speci￿cation voters have dy-
namically inconsistent preferences and underestimate the value of public investments.
As elections create sharp incentives, politicians converge to policies which re￿ ect the
incorrectly perceived interests of voters. Hence, politics becomes short-sighted.
The timing of our model is the following: In period one an incumbent politician is
already in o¢ ce. First, voters set a reservation utility level as the minimum requirement
for reelecting the incumbent. Then the politician in o¢ ce decides on the provision of
public goods and the level of rents. At the end of period one elections are held. If the
incumbent is reelected, he remains in o¢ ce for another term. If the incumbent is not
reelected, he is replaced by another politician.
We consider only one representative citizen in order to focus on distortions caused
by hyperbolic discounting and abstract from distributional con￿ icts among the elec-
torate.15 To capture the idea that individuals su⁄er from self-control problems, we
15Distributional con￿ icts among the electorate may also be responsible for policy distortions. Ro-
drik and Fernandez (1991), for example, show that uncertainty regading the individual bene￿ts from
policy reforms su¢ ces to distort public policy choices.
4need to distinguish carefully between the voter￿ s ex-post utility U (1) representing his
long-term utility and the voter￿ s ex-ante utility e U (3) which is his instantaneous utility
in period one.
The representative voter￿ s ex post utility U is given by
U(G;I;r) = Y ￿ T + H (G) + F(I) (1)
Here Y is an exogenous income and T a lump-sum tax which ￿nances public expen-
ditures. In order to di⁄erentiate between long-term and short-term expenditures, we
assume that the government provides two di⁄erent kinds of public goods. First, a
public consumption G which increases the welfare of voters immediately. The public
investment good I on the other hand does not become e⁄ective until period two, but
promises a positive rate of return that more than compensates citizens for waiting until
the second period.16 The voter￿ s utility from both kinds of public goods, H(G) and
F(I); is increasing and strictly concave, i.e. H0 > 0;H00 < 0 and F 0 > 0;F 00 < 0
respectively.17 Moreover, we assume that F 0(0) > 1 in order to guarantee that it is
always bene￿cial for the voter if at least one marginal unit of his income is spent on
public investments. For simplicity, we do not allow for private saving possibilities, i.e.
the returns to public investments are the only source of income in period two. The
future utility from these investments F(I) is discounted by a standard discount rate
which is normalized to one throughout our analysis. The per-unit costs of both G and
I are set equal to unity. Correspondingly, the budget constraint of the government
including the incumbent politician￿ s rent r, that is derived below, is given by:
T = G + I + r (2)
The representative voter￿ s ex ante utility ~ U can be written as
e U(G;I;r) = Y ￿ T + H(G) + ￿F(I) (3)
The crucial di⁄erence between U and ~ U is the reduced valuation of next period￿ s
utility expressed by ￿ < 1; although the standard discount rate is normalized to unity.18
Intuitively, the voter neglects the advantages of investments partly as these only become
16Empiricially, the distinction between public consumption and investment expenditures is blurred.
We understand G as the sum of all public expenditures that become e⁄ective in the short term.
17In order to restrict the analysis to interior solutions we assume further that H0(0) ￿ 1;H0(Y ) <
1;F0(0) ￿ 1;F0(Y ) < 1:
18We adapt the general case of dynamically-inconsistent preferences to our two-period-model. For
the general case see Laibson (1997).
5apparent in period two. Hence, his election decision is based on the ex-ante utility e U. In
contrast, optimal behavior which maximizes long-run well-being takes U as benchmark.
The government decides on the allocation of tax revenues. It consists of a single
politician in our framework. Furthermore, any selection issues are excluded as all
politicians, the incumbent and his competitors, are identical. Therefore, voters can only
discipline politicians by threatening not to reelect them again. In total, an incumbent
politician￿ s objective function is given by:
P = ￿r + pI (r)￿R (4)
Politicians are interested in political rents net of transaction costs ￿r and an ego rent
R for holding o¢ ce next period. The rents r are directly taken out of the government
budget and represent wasteful government expenditures that entail no value for citizens
like excessive pension payments. The transaction cost associated with extracting rents
is denoted by ￿, where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. The lower ￿, the more transparent are political
procedures, i.e. the more costly it is for the incumbent to extract rents for private
purposes. The level of rents r chosen by the incumbent determines his reelection
probability pI: The more rents are extracted, the less likely is reelection. The only
motif for being reelected is the ego rent R from holding o¢ ce in the second period.
As an internal reward, the ego rent is una⁄ected by the transparency of the political
process and exogenous in our two-period model. Moreover, we assume that all actors
including the politicians have dynamically inconsistent preferences and discount future
rewards with ￿ < 1.19
The representative voter can discipline the incumbent politician by threatening not
to reelect him if his utility falls below a certain reservation utility U. If instead the
voters￿reservation utility is reached, the incumbent is reelected with certainty.20 Thus,
the reelection probability is
pI =
￿
1 if e U (G;I;r) ￿ U
0 otherwise
(5)
Given the voter￿ s strategy, the incumbent has two options. Either he pleases the voter
and provides the required utility level. This allows only for the extraction of moderate
rents, but secures the ego rent R. Alternatively, he can abstain from being reelected
19Note that it does not a⁄ect the results qualitatively whether bureaucrats and politicians are
hyperbolic discounters as well.
20By restricting the analysis to one representative voter, it is implicitly assumed that voters are
able to coordinate on an optimal voting strategy.
6and take maximum rents today which are limited by the total income Y:
When setting the optimal reservation utility U
￿
, the voter regards his perceived
utility e U as objective. Correspondingly, the maximum perceived welfare the politician
can generate is e U￿ (by providing e G￿ and e I￿). As the voter receives U = 0 if the
incumbent accepts not being reelected, it is always worthwhile to implement some
level of public good provision. Hence, the voter will assure that the incumbent is
better of with moderate current rents plus the continuation value of future rents than
with exploiting his discretion. The related participation constraint of the incumbent
can be written as
￿r + ￿R ￿ ￿Y (6)
This participation constraint forces the voter to concede a rent r￿ = Y ￿ ￿R
￿ which is
just enough to make the incumbent indi⁄erent between being re-elected and leaving
o¢ ce. The equilibrium rent r￿ depends on the value of future terms in o¢ ce R and
the costs of extracting rents ￿: If the transparency of the political process ￿ increases,
the rent r￿ shrinks and approaches r￿ = 0 for ￿ ! 0:21





= Y ￿ r
￿ ￿ e G
￿ ￿ e I
￿ + H(e G
￿) + ￿F(e I
￿) < e U
￿ (7)
Maximizing his objective function (4) given the voters￿reservation utility (7); the
politician provides public goods such that the following ￿rst-order conditions are ful-
￿lled:22
H






This means that the politician provides both public goods in the amount that pleases
the voter most and seizes a net-rent ￿r￿ such that the voter￿ s reservation utility U
￿
is
just reached. Hence, he is reelected and receives the ego rent R as well. We sum up
our results in
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the retrospective voting model with hyperbolic dis-
counting agents is characterized by a public good provision that is best from the ex ante
perspective of voters. This implies that the level of public consumption is e¢ cient,
but the level of public investment ine¢ ciently low when applying voter￿ s ex post utility
21Attention is restricted to the cases where r ￿ 0:
22We assume that the budget constraint is never binding.
7as the relevant utility measure. The incumbent politician is re-elected and receives a
net-rent ￿r￿ and the ego rent R.
This equilibrium entails two ine¢ ciencies:23 On the one hand there are positive
rents r￿ for politicians. This "imperfect agency" distortion can be alleviated by in-
creasing the transparency of the political process: If ￿ goes to zero, this distortion
even disappears completely. The second ine¢ ciency, however, consists in a distorted
allocation of the budget. The insu¢ ciently low level of public investment is due to
the dynamic inconsistency of voters￿preferences. If the political process is made more
transparent, this "populist" distortion is not mitigated.
3 Incorporating a bureaucracy
To assess whether the in￿ uence of bureaucrats mitigates the problem of underinvest-
ment in the framework outlined above, we ￿rst consider the incentives bureaucrats
face. According to Niskanen (1971) bureaucrats are mainly interested in the size of
their budget as this is positively correlated to privileges like power. Moreover, bu-
reaucrats are (at least not immediately) responsible to the electorate.24 We start from
this account, but emphasize that bureaucrats face ￿ soft￿responsibility constraints and
need to preserve a certain level of public support to be protected against unpleasant
interventions by politicians. This restriction prevents bureaucrats from increasing I
and G in￿nitely. Therefore, we write the bureaucrat￿ s objective function as25
B = V (G;I) ￿ C (G;I) (10)
The gain of in￿ uence associated with the size of the budget V (G;I) follows the reason-
ing that bureaucrats strive to maximize an objective function which depends positively
on the size of the budget of their agency like
V (G;I) = (1 ￿ ￿)(G + I) (11)
23Due to quasi-linear structure of the voters￿utility function in our model, these two issues can be
separated neatly.
24In the long run, i.e. after two periods, voters know whether public investments have been suc-
cessful. As long as the performance of bureaucrats is not evaluated until the second period, voters￿
short-sightedness is not adopted by bureaucrats.
25Note that our results are not sensitive to the speci￿c construction of the bureaucrat￿ s objective
function, but only require that they tend to increase public expenditures, however not ad in￿nitum.
8Here ￿ 2 [0;1] is a constant factor representing the bene￿ts associated with high
budgets and necessary for making both components of the bureaucrat￿ s objective com-
parable. The lower is ￿; the more is the bureaucrat of a Niskanen-type and the more
important is budget size to him.
Though bureaucrats do not face any sharp reelection constraints, their privileges
considerably depend on the standing of their agency.26 Accordingly, we assume that
the costs of excessively increasing an agency￿ s budget C (G;I) rise with the di⁄erence
between f U￿ and the actually provided utility level:
C (G;I) = e U
￿ ￿ e U(G;I) (12)
Put simply, a bureaucrat faces a trade-o⁄when increasing public expenditures beyond
the levels considered optimally by voters. Thus, the bureaucrat increases public expen-
ditures such that the marginal gain of in￿ uence derived from a higher budget exactly
equals the marginal loss of in￿ uence associated with the declining public support when
public goods are oversupplied.
Based on the above analysis, we now look at a setting where bureaucrats are able
to in￿ uence policy decisions due to their informational advantage. This interaction
between politicians and bureaucrats is modelled as a Nash-bargaining game where the
latter have a small, but not negligible in￿ uence.
To demonstrate Proposition 2 we set-up the following Nash-Maximand:
￿ = ￿log(P ￿ P0) + (1 ￿ ￿)log(B ￿ B0)
where ￿ represents the in￿ uence of the politician.






















0(I)) = 0 (14)
We ￿rst consider the extreme cases. If ￿ = 1 the politician has all bargaining power
and the result is the same as in the basic model without bureaucrats. Correspondingly,
the public consumption good G is provided e¢ ciently. However, the level of I provided
is ine¢ ciently low as voters do not value investments su¢ ciently. In the case of ￿ = 0
26For example, an agency that spends too much faces a higher risk of restructuring.
9the bureaucrat has full bargaining power. Then the ￿rst order conditions become:
H






In that case the public consumption good G is provided excessively as long as ￿ <
1; i.e. as along as bureaucrats have a slight direct interest in public expenditures.
The provision of the public investment good is always higher than in the case where
the politician decides alone and only excessive if the expenditure bias dominates the
distortion from hyperbolic discounting, i.e. if ￿ < ￿. In the case of ￿ = 1; the
politician provides the e¢ cient amount of the consumption good G, but undersupplies
the investment good I as known from (8) and (9). For the intermediate cases with
0 < ￿ < 1 the precise outcome, G￿
NBand I￿
NB; depends on the weight ￿ and the outside
positions P ￿ P0 and B ￿ B0 respectively. Independent of the exact bargaining power
of the two parties it is always the case that the public consumption good is excessively
provided for ￿ < 1 and that the public investment good is delivered in an amount
which is higher than in the case where the politician decides alone.
If voters know that politicians depend on bureaucrats when providing public goods,
they will take this additional restriction into account when setting their reservation
utility for reelecting the incumbent. In fact, they acknowledge that a certain reduction
in their utility is due to a bureaucracy that cannot (at least not in the short-term)
be in￿ uenced by politicians. Hence, they concede the government to provide a lower
utility level U
￿
B than in the case when politicians alone determine public policy:
U
￿
B = Y ￿ r
￿ ￿ e G
￿
NB ￿ e I
￿
NB + H(e G
￿
NB) + ￿F(e I
￿
NB) < U < e U
￿ (17)
where e G￿
NB > e G￿ and e I￿
NB > e I￿:
Comparing (8) and (9) with (15) and (16) yields
Proposition 2 When the in￿uence of bureaucrats is taken into account, the public
consumption good G is provided excessively as long as ￿ < 1. The provision of the
public investment good I is always higher than in the case where the politician decides
alone and excessive if ￿ < ￿.
104 Welfare Analysis
When bureaucrats in￿ uence policy decisions, voters￿ex ante utility de￿nitely shrinks.
Yet, it might well be that due to the increase in public investments voters￿ex post
utility rises. In the following we prove this hypothesis and argue that a (limited)
in￿ uence of bureaucrats is welfare-increasing. In doing so, we build on the assumption
that time-inconsistent preferences need to be regarded as a real distortion transmitted
by the political process. However, one could also regard today￿ s utility as the relevant
welfare measure. Accordingly, a low level of public investments is socially optimal and
requires no further consideration. This argument has especially been put forward by
Gul and Pesendorfer (2002) who do not regard reneging on one￿ s own promises as a
dynamic inconsistency, but as a change in preferences. Yet, we repudiate this latter
view in line with O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003) and consider ex post utility as the
normatively relevant long-run well-being.27 This re￿ ects the evidence of costly and
super￿ uous commitment devices like illiquid assets suggests that the relevant welfare
measure is voters￿￿ ex post utility U:28
To asses the welfare implications of the in￿ uence of bureaucrats, we need to consider
how voters￿ ex post utility U changes when the in￿ uence of bureaucrats increases
slightly, i.e. if ￿ decreases. Thereby we start from a situation where politicians take
public policy decisions alone (￿ = 1): As a consequence G = e G￿ and I = e I￿.
@U(e G￿; e I￿;r￿)
@￿
=





















Equation (18) shows that the overall e⁄ect of a change in the bargaining power of the
bureaucrat depends on two issues: Firstly, its e⁄ect on public goods provision and,
secondly, the e⁄ect of the change of public goods provision on welfare. We can state
Proposition 3 Starting from ￿ = 1, a marginal rise in the bureaucrat￿ s bargaining
power increases the provision of both public goods G and I: As the welfare e⁄ect of the
increase in G does not matter at the margin and the welfare e⁄ect of the increase in I
is positive, voters￿overall welfare must rise. Proof see Appendix.
27According to O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003, p.3) hyperbolic discounting "[...] re￿ ects a short-
term desire or propensity that the person disapproves of at every moment in her life. Our welfare
analysis [...] treats this preference for immediate grati￿cation as an error." Equally, Laibson (1998)
uses hyperbolic model to justify national saving plans.
28See Strotz (1956) for additional examples like Christmas Clubs which are hard to justify if
individuals are perfectly rational.
11The idea behind this reasoning is a typical second best argument: the increase of
public consumption is a second order loss, whereas the increase of public investment is
a ￿rst order gain. Given that one distortion already exists - in our case the underinvest-
ment of politicians in face of elections - it is welfare enhancing to introduce a second
distortion - the expenditure bias of bureaucrats - to mitigate the original distortion. As
public consumption is provided optimally when the politician alone determines policies,
a marginal increase in its provision has no ￿rst-order welfare e⁄ects. Yet, the marginal
increase in public investment is a ￿rst-order gain as public investment is underprovided
in the beginning.
5 Extensions
So far we have only considered the case where public consumption and public invest-
ment were equally relevant, yet the relevance of long-term investments di⁄ers empiri-
cally across policy areas. To capture this feature, we introduce weights for the di⁄erent
kinds of public goods in the following. In doing so, we show that the optimal level of
bureaucrat￿ s in￿ uence depends on the relative importance of consumption and invest-
ment in a given policy area. Intuitively, the level of in￿ uence is mainly determined by
the degree of independence of a bureaucracy. To derive our result, we ￿rst prove that
an optimal level of independence exists.
Evidently, the bene￿t of an increase in investments due to the bureaucrats￿in￿ u-
ence is less important the higher the level of investment already is. At the same time,
the costs of excessively supplying public consumption increase with the level of public
consumption. Consequently, there is a point where the bene￿ts and costs of the bu-
reaucrat￿ s in￿ uence just cancel out. This optimal level of bureaucracy is determined
by the maximization of voters￿actual utility with respect to ￿; i.e.
max
￿ U = Y ￿ G(￿) ￿ I (￿) ￿ r + H (G(￿)) + F (I (￿)) (19)










Proposition 4 A socially optimal level of the bureaucrats￿in￿uence ￿￿ exists and is
characterized by (20). Proof see Appendix.
12In order to capture the idea that the importance of long-term investments di⁄ers
across policy areas, we introduce a weight ￿ 2 (0;1) that represents the relative im-
portance of investment expenditures. Correspondingly, (1 ￿ ￿) describes the relative
importance of consumption expenditures: Then the area speci￿c optimal level of bu-










When investments are important, (F 0 (I) ￿ 1) @I
@￿ is weighted with ￿ > 0:5. and
(H0(G) ￿ 1) with (1 ￿ ￿) < 0:5: This implies that the investment part of the distor-
tion, that is alleviated by the bureaucrat, becomes more relevant. At the same time,
the consumption part of the distortion, that is aggravated by the bureaucrat, becomes
less relevant. As a consequence, the optimal level of in￿ uence of bureaucrats is an
increasing function of the sector speci￿c importance of public investment. Moreover,
our result implies that - if the in￿ uence of bureaucrats is optimally assigned across
sectors - the supply of public consumption goods is especially excessive in sectors with
an emphasis on long-term expenditures.29
Our result crucially depends on the partial independence of bureaucrats from poli-
tics, especially from the government. In contrast to that, bureaucrats which are "polit-
ical" depend to a large extend on the success of the government that appointed them.
This in turn changes their incentives dramatically: it e⁄ectively aligns the interests of
bureaucrats with those of the government. In that case, the bene￿cial long-term e⁄ect
of the expenditure bias is lost. Hence, our analysis also provides a rational for why civil
service procedures are often constitutionally secured. If the government could freely
choose to appoint a ￿career bureaucrat￿or a ￿political bureaucrat￿ , it would opt for
a "political bureaucrat" as this increases short-term expenditures thereby improving
the government￿ s chances to stay in power. This ￿nding is in line with the recom-
mendations of Evans and Rauch (1999) who highlight the importance of meritocratic
recruitment through competitive examinations and civil service procedures for hiring
and ￿ring.
29The level of both public goods will be higher in policy areas where investments are crucial.
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This paper starts from the observation that public budgets in many countries are bi-
ased towards consumption expenditures. We set up a model in which this feature
results from strict electoral competition when voter have hyperbolic preferences. Un-
der these circumstances, the same electoral constraints that discipline politicians on
the one hand, induce them to allocate too many resources to present consumption and
too little to public investment as voters undervalue public investments. Bureaucrats,
however, are not directly responsible to voters, but appointed for lifetime. The cor-
responding insensitivity regarding the interests of voters induces an increase of public
expenditures. Consequently, a bargaining game between politicians and bureaucrats
leads to a bene￿cial mix of distortions where the political bias towards present expen-
ditures is mitigated by the expenditure bias of bureaucrats.
We conclude that the independence of bureaucracies from political competition does
not always need to be detrimental - even though it gives rise to an expenditure bias.
Given that elections tend to make politics short-sighted, an independent bureaucracy
might even be welfare enhancing. In other words, bureaucrats￿limited necessity of
being responsible to the electorate does not only have a negative impact on their
performance and the size of the public budget as in our model. It also creates a long-
term perspective which might be highly valuable in an environment of ￿erce political
competition. This ￿nding demonstrates that the welfare e⁄ects of institutions like the
bureaucracy need to be considered in the broader context of public decision-making,
i.e. in the context of the interaction between di⁄erent political agents.
The above model can be extended to a multi-period model where a new type of
political business cycle could be derived. If some investments yield a return during
the period in which the elected government is in power, we would expect that the bias
towards present consumption increases as the election date is approached. This impli-
cation could be tested empirically. Moreover, it could be asked how agencies can ever
become independent. Therefore, a constitutional stage where voters decide on whether
to establish a (partly) independent bureaucracy needs to be taken into account. If vot-
ers are aware of their self-control problems and if they have rational expectations about
their future behavior, i.e. if voters are so-called sophisticated hyperbolic discounters
(Laibson, 1997), they might opt for making bureaucracies (partly) independent using
them as a device to commit themselves to support public investment in the future.
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Proof of Proposition 3
As
@U( e G￿;e I￿)
@￿ is evaluated at ￿ = 1, we know that
@U( e G￿;e I￿)
@G = ￿1 + H0(e G￿) = 0:
Correspondingly,
@U( e G￿;e I￿)
@I = ￿1 + F 0(e I￿) > 0 as ￿1 + ￿F 0(e I￿) = 0 and ￿ < 1:
As mentioned before, @r
@￿ = 0.
The e⁄ects of changing the bargaining power ￿ is determined as follows:
Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition (13) of the bargaining game with respect to





P￿P0 (H0 (G) ￿ 1) ￿ 1













B￿B0 (H0 (G) ￿ ￿)
H00(G)
As ￿ 2 [0;1] and H0(G) = 1 at ￿ = 1; H0(G) ￿ ￿ > 0: Moreover, H00 (G) < 0 by
assumption, hence we know that @G
@￿ < 0:
Equally, we derive @I
@￿:
Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition (14) of the bargaining game with respect to





P￿P0 (￿F 0(I) ￿ 1) ￿ 1













B￿B0 (￿F 0(I) ￿ ￿)
￿F 00(I)
As ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿F 0(I) = 1at ￿ = 1; ￿F 0(I) ￿ ￿ > 0: Moreover, F 00 (I) < 0 by
assumption, hence we know that @I
@￿ < 0.
15@G
@￿ < 0 and @I
@￿ < 0 imply that the provision of both kinds of public goods increases
if the in￿uence of the bureaucrat rises, i.e. if ￿ falls. Hence,
@U( e G￿;e I￿;r￿)
@￿ < 0 at ￿ = 1
which implies that a slight increase of the bureaucrat￿ s in￿uence, i.e. a reduction of ￿,
increases voters￿welfare.
Proof of Proposition 4
H0(G) and F 0(I) are monotonously decreasing in G and I by assumption. Moreover,
we know that due to the set-up of the bargaining game G and I are monotonously
decreasing in ￿: As shown in proof 1, the LHS of equation (20) is negative at ￿ = 1 ;
i.e. (H0(G) ￿ 1) = 0 and (F 0 (I) ￿ 1) > 0. If ￿ decreases, G as well as I increase since
@G
@￿ < 0 and @I
@￿ < 0 (see A1 and A2): Correspondingly, the expression (H0(G) ￿ 1)
becomes negative and the positive expression (F 0 (I) ￿ 1) smaller. As @G
@￿ and @I
@￿ are
continuous in ￿ and as the LHS of equation (20) is negative at ￿ = 0 , a ￿￿ such that
(20) is ful￿lled must exist. This ￿￿ must be a unique maximum since starting from
￿ = 1 U increases when ￿ falls as shown in the proof of proposition 3.
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